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A
deal has been written during the past several years about the
increasing number of professional liability actions that are being brought
against attorneys by their former clients. Indeed, some commentators have
taken the position that a legal malpraCtice "crisis", similar to the medical
malpractice crisis that has so adversely affected physicians in recent years, is
imminent for the bar. This short note will turn away from the factual
question concerning the existence of such a crisis and look instead at the
legal issues that form the basis of an attorney's professional liability
exposure in Virginia.
A Virginia First
Beginning with the historical background, one discovers that the
Commonwealth of Virginia has the rather dubious distinction of being the
battleground where the first legal malpractice action in America was fought
at the appellate level. 1 The negligence complained of in this case was the
attorney's failure to file a necessary pleading which, in turn, caused a
judgment previously recovered by the plaintiff to be reversed. The attorney
In question defended on the merits and also on the ground that, since he did
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from William and Mary School of Law and an LL. M. from New York University School
of Law. He is the author of a number of articles in the fields of estate planning and fiduciary
administration.
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1
not receive any compensation for his services, he should not be liable for any
loss that the plaintiff might have suffered, even though such loss might be
attributable to a lack of due care on his part.
In deciding this case of first impression in this country, the Court of
Appeals stated that "it is undoubtedly true that an attorney is liable for
neglect of duty and that he is bound to make retribution to his client for the
injury which he may thereby sustain." 2 And, in responding to the defense
based on lack of consideration, the Court stated that "though a man is not
bound to do an act for another without a reward, yet if he will voluntarily
engage, and enter upon the performance of it, he is liable for the
consequences of his improper management." 3
Definition Added
This statement of an attorney's liability to his client has since been
codified by the General Assembly and now appears in the Code of Virginia
as follows: "Every attorney at law shall be liable to his client for any damage
sustained by him by the neglect of his duty as such attorney." 4 This basic
statement of the rule has received added definition over the years as
appellate cases involving the attorney malpractice issue have been decided,
and the present general rule has been stated by the Virginia Supreme Court
as follows:
The law implies a promise on the part of attorneys that they will execute
the business intrusted to their professional management, with a
reasonable degree of care, skill, and dispatch, and they are liable to an
action if guilty of a default in either of these duties whereby their clients
are injured, and this liability of the attorney is not affected by the
client's diligence or the want of it, unless stipulated for by special
contract. While there can be no doubt that for any misfeasance or
unreasonable neglect of an attorney whereby his client suffers a loss an
action may be supported and damages recovered to the amount of the
loss, yet it is equally well established that an attorney in !he
management of his professional business is not bound to an
extraordinary diligence, but only to use a reasonable degree of care and
skill, reference being had to the character of the business he undertakes
to do, and is not to be answerable for every error or mistake, but, on the
contrary, will be protected if he acts in good faith, to the best of his skill
and knowledge, and with an ordinary degree of attention. 5
Tort vs. Contract
While the rule of attorney liability has long been established in Virginia, it
has been unknown during most of this time whether the Virginia
was
based on a tort theory or on a contract theory. Under the contract theory it is
said that when a lawyer agrees to perform a service for a client, he makes an
implied promise to use reasonable skill and diligence. If he fails to do so,
then he has breached the contract and is liable in an action thereon. Under
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the tort theory it is said that when an attorney and his client enter into the
attorney-client relationship, the law imposes a duty on the attorney to use
due care in the handling of the client's case. If the attorney fails to exercise
due care, then he is guilty of negligence and is liable in a tort action.
On the surface it might appear to not make any difference which theory a
jurisdiction might adopt because the end result is the same in both cases.
This appearance is illusory, however, because there are three major
differences between the two theories: (I) it is possible to recover punitive
damages in appropriate tort cases; (2) the statute of limitations is shorter in
tort cases; and (3) lack of privity is typically no defense in a tort case.
This issue of tort theory vs. contract theory was finally brought before the
Court in Oleyar v. Kerr, Trustee, 6 a case wherein the plaintiff had verbally
retained the defendant to make a title examination of certain real property.
The defendant attorney conceded that he was negligent in not discovering a
particular judgment lien and defended on the ground that the one year
statute of limitations applicable to non-surviving torts was applicable and
that it had expired. After surveying the cases from other jurisdictions, the
Supreme Court decided to "adopt the better reasoned view which is found in
those cases which hold that an action for the negligence of an attorney in the
performance of professional services, w~ile sounding in tort, is an action for
breach of contract and thus governed by the statute of limitations applicable
to contracts. "7

i

Statute of Umitations
Although the Oleyar case settled that the contract theory would obtain in
Virginia, it nevertheless left several questions still unresolved. First of all, it
is unclear from a reading of this case whether the statute of limitations will
be
years if there is a written contract of employment and ten years if the
written contract of employment is made a covenant by the placing of a
"(SEAL)" thereon, or whether the applicable period will be three years in all
cases because the liability is based on an implied term in the contract of
employment. Accordingly, in recognition of the possibility that the longer
statutes may be held to apply when such a case comes before the Court,
prudence would seem to suggest a leaving off of the "(SEAL)" which serves
no worthwhile purpose in the average case and which might later be held to
keep the attorney liable for double the period of an ordinary written
contract of employment.
one has determined what statute of limitations is applicable to his
case, the second question is "When does this period of time start to run?"
This question was before the Court in McCormick v. Romans and Gunn,s
where the client verbally retained an attorney to handle the sale of a portion
of
real estate in April of 1963. After repeated attempts to obtain an
accounting from the attorney, the client filed suit in November of 1967,
which was more than three years after the oral contract was entered into
with the attorney. In concluding that a defense based on the running of the
statute of limitations was not sufficient, the Supreme Court stated that
1977
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"where there is an undertaking which requires a continuation of services, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the termination of the
undertaking. This special rule is applicable to a continuing agreement
between attorney and client.. Indeed it is particularly appropriate to an
attorney-client agreement in view of the trust and confidence inherent in
that relationship." 9 The Court was of the further opinion that the agreement
in question was not terminated until "the misappropriations by (the
attorney) were discovered and demand was made in October, 1967, for
payment of the balance claimed to be due." 1° Consequently, the three year
period did not begin to run until that time.
a Factor
The holding of the McCormick case has grave implications for a number
of Virginia attorneys whose relationships with one or more clients may be
said to be of a continuing nature. Take, for example, the common practice
of some attorneys in serving as custodian of their clients' wills or other legal
documents after all of the legal work thereon has been finished, the fee paid,
and the file placed among the inactive or dead files. Will the retention of the
will or other document, which is done merely as a convenience to the client,
prevent the statute oflimitations from beginning to run on any error in such
documents until such time as the documents are delivered to the client or the
negligence is discovered, whichever comes first? One can be sure that this
argument will be advanced against the attorney/ custodian and, thus,
prudence might suggest that (1) attorneys no longer serve as a custodian of
their clients' wills or other documents, and (2) that when a particular
representation for a client comes to an end, a termination letter to that effect
be sent to the client even though the attorney is continuing to represent the
same client on other matters.
Even though an attorney should take all of the appropriate steps to
eliminate the possibility of the continuing relationship argument being
raised against him, he must still respond to the question "When does the
statutory period begin to run?" At this time there is no clearly defined
Virginia rule. The older American cases rather consistently held
the
statute of limitations should start running from the time the attorney
actually made the negligent mistake.
However, many of the more recent American cases have held that, since it
is impossible to expect a client to be able to bring an action at law prior to
becoming aware of the existence of the negligent mistake, the statute of
limitations cannot begin to run until the wrong is, or, in the exercise of due
diligence, should be discovered. While this issue has not yet been before the
Virginia Supreme Court in the context of a legal malpractice case, the Court
did reject the discovery rule in the case of Hawks v. De Hart, 11 which
involved medical malpractice. It has been suggested, however, that the
Hawks case is not only out of step with the developing law in Virginia's
neighboring states but that it is also capable of being distinguished on its
facts. 12
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Retain Coverage
Accordingly, when a case involving legal malpractice comes before the
Court it is possible that the discovery rule might then be adopted. Since it is
thus possible that the Virginia attorney may truly have what some
commentators refer to as "liability for life," prudence might suggest than an
attorney give consideration to retaining his professional liability insurance
coverage after he retires, goes on the bench, or leaves practice for any other
reason.
Now that the length of the attorney's malpractive exposure has been
surveyed, it is time to consider the breadth of this exposure and ask, "Who
may bring a malpractice action against an attorney?"
Briefly stated, the doctrine of privity of contract limits those pers.ons who
can sue for breach of a contract to those persons who are parties (or have
privity with parties) to the contract. For instance, if A and C should enter
into a contract which A should breach, it is clear that B cannot bring an
action at law against A to recover for A's wrongful conduct because Bis not
in privity with A. And this makes rather obvious sense.
Suppose, however, that the contract in question is one between Attorney
and Client to draft a will leaving Client's entire estate to Beneficiary. If
Attorney breaches the contract by negligently causing the will to be
defectively executed so that Client dies intestate and Beneficiary takes
nothing, should B now be able to bring an action at law against A? There is
still no privity of contract and, under the historic common law rule, the
answer is no - B still cannot sue. However, a new trend began in California,
in 1961, in the case of Lucas v. Hamm 13 which several commentators have
analogized in importance to the famous case of McPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. 14 The jurisdictions following this trend take the position that under the
above circumstances it is more just to extend the professional liability of the
attorney to foreseeable third parties than to impose the loss occasioned by
the attorney's negligence on the innocent beneficiary, and, consequently,
they have abrogated the attorney's defense which was based on lack of
privity of contract.
The Privity Question
Turning to the Virginia law concerning privity of contract, one notes that
Sectwn 54-46 Va. Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1974) reads "Every attorney at law
be hable to his client ... (emphasis added). If this emphasized language is
taken literally, it could be argued that it amounts to a codification of the
common law doctrine requiring privity of contract on the part of those who
would seek to hold an attorney liable for his negligence. It is not at all clear
that this language was intended to be so interpreted or that the Supreme
Court would be inclined to accept such an interpretation today. In fact,
there are several policy indicators which suggest that the Court would not
a~cept such a restrictive interpretation of this code section. First of all,
yirginia abolished the privity rule in all cases involving products liahility,1s
Ill 1962, in response to public policy arguments similar to those now being
APRIL 1977
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advanced in the legal
cases.
Furthermore, Virgima also recognizes the doctrine of third party
beneficiary contracts 16 -which permits one who is not a party to a contract
to enforce the contract if it was made for his benefit, in whole or in part
(emphasis added), even though the third party is not mentioned anywhere in
the contract. Refering back to the hypothetical case posed above, it would
seem rather clear that B was an intended beneficiary of C's contract with A.
And, although a will case has been chosen to illustrate the potential scope of
an attorney's third party liability, it should be noted that this development is
not confined to the estate planning area but is spreading throughout many
other areas of the law as well.17
It would seem, then, that the climate of public policy in Virginia is quite
favorable to the reception of this new trend towards the elimination of the
privity defense in actions to recover for legal malpractice. Accordingly, it is
concluded that the Virginia attorney not only has a potential "liability for
life" but that he also may have as broad an exposure to third party liability
as do the attorneys in any other jurisdiction. 18
FOOTNOTES
Stephens v. White, 2 Va. (2 Wash) 203 (1796).
Id., p. 211. The requirement of an actual "injury" was emphasized in Virginia's most recent
legal malpractice case, Allied Productions, Inc. v. Duesterdick, decided March 4, 1977,
wherein the Supreme Court held that "when a client has suffered a judgment for money
damages as the proximate result of his lawyer's negligence such judgment constitutes
actual damages recoverable in a suit for legal malpractice only to the extent such judgment
has been paid." Accordingly, a motion for judgment that failed to allege payment of such
judgment failed to state a cause of action.
3 Id., pp. 211-212.
4 Section 54-46 Va. Code Ann. (Rep!. Vol. 1974). This section has further language dealing
with an attorney's liability for his clients' funds (which is also treated in Section 26-5). This
subject is not covered in this note.
5 Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 581 (1951); See also Staples Ex'ors v. Staples, 85 Va. 76
(1888); For a jury instruction that "fairly states the obligation, duty and care that is owed
by an attorney to his client," see Fowler v. Tobacco Growers, Inc., 195 Va. 770 (1954).
6 217 Va. 88 (1976).
7 Id., p. 90.
s 214 Va. 144 (1973).
9 Id., pp. 148-149.
IO Id., p. 149.
11 206 Va. 810 (1966).
12 Lahy, "Perpetuities, Privity and Professional Liability," 2 U. Rich. Law Notes 203 (1966).
13 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P. 2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
14 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916), the precedent setting case thatled to the abolishing of
lack of privity of contract as a defense in products liability cases.
is Section 8.2-318, Va. Code Ann. (Add. vol. 1965).
16 Section 55-22, Va. Code Ann. (Rep. vol. 1974).
17 See "Attorney's Liability, to One Other Than His Immediate Client, for Consequences of
Negligence in Carrying Out Legal Duties," Ann. 45 ALR 3rd 1181 (1972).
is For those who wish to pursue these legal issues beyond this survey, The Defense Research
Institute, Inc., 1100 West Wells Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233, has published an
Annotated Bibliography, Liability of Attorneys (Vol. 1975 No. 2) that collects most of the
periodical writing in this area.
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